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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes optimal taxation problems in overlapping generation economies with
production where agents live I periods. The primal approach is used to characterize the
optimal …scal policy in steady state and along the transition path to some steady state. The
key …ndings is that under certain assumptions (complete set of instruments and separability
of the utility function) capital taxes are zero along the transition path to the steady state
after two periods. This result is an equivalent version of Chamley (1986) with OG. With
additional assumptions it can be shown that non-separable utility functions satisfy the zero
capital taxes result in steady state.
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This paper analyzes the optimal …scal policy in overlapping generation economies
with production where agents live I periods. The primal approach is used to characterize the
optimal taxes in steady state and along the transition path to some steady state. The basic
idea is to transform the government problem of choosing the optimal taxes, into a simple
programming problem of choosing allocations subject to some constraints.
The key …ndings is that if the set of taxes is complete and the utility is homothetic and
separable, then capital taxes are zero along the transition path to the steady state after two
periods. This result is an equivalent version of Chamley (1986) with overlapping generations.
With additional assumptions in the discount factor and endowment of e¢ciency units, it can
be shown that non-separable utility functions satisfy the zero capital taxes result in steady
state, but not during the transition path. This is due to the fact that from the government
point of view, under this assumptions, the overlapping generation economy is equivalent to
an in…nitely lived economy.
Optimal taxation literature tries to answer how taxes should be set in an e¢cient way
(in a constrained e¢cient sense). For this purpose the government is introduced as an active
agent in the economy that chooses optimally the …scal policy according to some objective
function. In the last decade the optimal taxation literature, that started with Ramsey (1927)
seminal paper, has take over analysis of policy design in macroeconomic models. The primal
approach developed by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) for static economies and for Lucas and
Stokey (1983) for dynamic economies has been very successful for the analysis of the optimal
…scal policy. Most of the recent literature has focused in the optimal …scal design in in…nitely
lived economies, see Chari et al. (1991, 1994 and 1998), Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993),Aiyagari (1995) and others.
The …rst paper that introduces the optimal taxation problem in a two period overlap-
ping generation economy is Pestieau (1974). He analyzes the optimal …nancing of a public
investment. An important contribution in the framework of the OG model is Atkinson and
Sandmo (1980). They study the optimal …nancing of non-productive public consumption ex-
penditure. In this environment if the government has access to a full set of tax instruments,
that include lump-sum taxes, the optimal policy can achieve full e¢cient allocations. Both
papers limit their analysis to steady state solutions. More recently, Escolano (1992) uses an
optimal taxation approach to quantify the ine¢ciencies of the …scal system of the United
States economy. He shows that under certain restrictions in the policy instruments, the …s-
cal system can not be consider as suboptimal, so positive taxes on capital may be optimal.
Atkeson et al. (1999) in a two period OG also show that capital taxes are zero in steady
state.
The scope of this paper is to provide a general framework for analyzing optimal tax-
ation issues in large economies where agents diverge in their age. As a …rst step, this paper
proofs some results in characterizing the optimal …scal policy specially along the transition
path to some steady state.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce the basic environment and
de…ne a competitive equilibriumwith distortions. Section 3 describes the government problem
of choosing the optimal …scal policy, and section 4 introduces the primal approach for solving
optimal taxation problems. Section 5 derives the zero capital tax for the transition path.
Section 6 derives the basic results for the steady state, and section 7 introduces the optimal
…scal problem in an environment with incomplete set taxes. Finally, section 8 concludes.
22. Environment
The model is a standard production economy with two goods, consumption-capital
good and leisure. Agents live I periods and each cohort is populated by a continuum of
households. For simplicity we assume that population is stationary and its total size is
normalize to one.
There is a representative …rm that produces aggregate output Yt using a constant
returns to scale production function F(Kt;Lt), using capital Kt and labor Lt as primary
inputs (measured in e¢ciency units). This technology is constant returns to scale, monotone,
strictly concave and satis…es the Inada conditions. Capital depreciates each period at a
constant rate ± 2 (0;1); there is no exogenous technological change. Competitive factor
markets ensure that factors are paid to its marginal product,
rt = FKt ¡ ± (1)
wt = FLt (2)
Households in this economy have standard preferences de…ned over consumption and











t denote consumption and leisure of a household of age i at time t, and
¯ > 0 is the subjective discount factor. The utility function u(¢) is C2; strictly increasing in
consumption, decreasing in labor, strictly concave and satis…es Inada conditions. The agents
are endowed at each period of a unit of divisible time and an age speci…c vector of e¢ciency
units ² = (²1:::;²I); that is assumed time invariant. Therefore at each period agents will
3decide how much to consume, save, and how many e¤ective units of labor supply to …rms.










t+1 = (1 ¡ ¿`i;t)wt²
i`
i
t + (1 + rt(1 ¡ µi;t))a
i
t i 2 [1;I]; 8t (5)
the …rst equation imposes that agents born and die with zero wealth, so agents can not die
indebted nor leave bequest. Let rt be the net return of asset holdings and wt is the wage rate
per e¢ciency units of labor. Households can accumulate wealth ai
t+1 in two forms, lending
capital to …rms and buying government debt of one period maturity. Let ¿ci;t; µki;t and ¿`i;t be
an age speci…c consumption capital and labor tax respectively.1 I assume that the government
can perfectly discriminate agents by age on their tax payments, and can monitor any side
trade done by agents. Therefore, I rule out any possibility of collusion among agents on
their investing decisions. Latter on we will see that dropping this assumption and imposing
the same taxes to all individuals will have important implications in the optimal policy.
Intertemporal trade between generations is allowed. The capital stock and debt at period
t = 0 is owned by the initial generations.
The government in this economy …nances an exogenous sequence of public expendi-
ture fGtg1
t=0, and redistributes resources between generations using taxes and debt. The
















t + Bt+1 = Gt + RtBt; 8t (6)
1In order to rule out corner solutions on the investment decisions of households, it is necessary impose a
tax on the return of debt. Otherwise agents with low capital tax would invest all their savings in capital and
none in debt, and the other way around. With this implicit tax on the return of debt the arbitrage condition
will holds for all agents. Abusing notation I will assume that net returns on capital and debt are the same
for each generation, but di¤erent across generations.
4On the left hand side we have government revenues from age speci…c taxes on con-
sumption, labor and capital and debt; on the right hand side we have government expenditure
in public consumption and payroll on debt. The government expenditure is assumed to be a





t + Kt+1 + Gt = F(Kt;Lt) + (1 ¡ ±)Kt; 8t (7)
Definition 1. Let ¼ = ff¿ci;t;¿`i;t;µi;tgI
i=1g1
t=0 be the in…nite sequence of policies, and let
ª be the set of all feasible policies. We denote by ¦ ½ ª the subset of policies for which
competitive equilibrium exists.
Definition 2. Given a policy rule ¼; and public consumption g; a competitive equilibrium










t=0; such that, the consumers maximize (3) subject to (4) and (5): In
the production sector (1) and (2) holds. Markets clear and feasibility is satis…ed.
Notice that we have not imposed the government budget constraint in the de…nition
of equilibrium. If all the equilibrium conditions are satis…ed but the government budget
constraint, then Walras law ensures that this constraint also is satis…ed.
Given the assumptions of concavity and monotonicity on the functional forms the
…rst-order conditions are su¢cient to characterize an interior solution.
3. Ramsey Equilibrium
Once we have de…ned a competitive equilibrium we want to focus our attention on
the government problem, which has to choose optimally a policy ¼ that maximize society’s
welfare (the utility of all generations), subject to constraints. This constraints imply, …rst
5that the government budget constraint has to be satis…ed in present value. Second, the addi-
tional constraint imposes that the optimal policy constitutes a competitive equilibrium with
distortionary taxes. I assume that the government has access to a commitment technology
that allows it in period 0; to bind itself choosing a one shot sequence of policies. This kind of
commitment technology has been proved that might cause time-consistency problems, as it
has been show by Stroz (1957), Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Chari et al. (1986). This
is because the government may have incentives to deviate from the optimal policy once it
has been announce. When the government does not have access to a commitment technol-
ogy, it is necessary to design reputation and credible mechanisms to avoid time consistency
problems, a reference in this literature are Chari and Kehoe (1990 and 93), Kotliko¤ (1988)
and Tabellini (1991). Alternatively Klein and Rios-Rull (1999) have solved the problem with
partial commitment. They …nd that the optimal capital taxes are very similar to the observed
in the data.
The Ramsey equilibrium concept treats the government as a dynamic player that takes
into account that changes in policies will a¤ect prices, allocations and hence government
revenues. Notice that in this type of environment players time horizon does not coincide,
while the government is an in…nitely lived player, households live I periods. Given that the
government has to foresight agents’ behavior is useful to describe allocations and prices using
rules.2The reaction function of each agent is useful to understand how individual decisions
change under changes in the policy.
2We do not make any assumption of uniqueness or continuity of the allocation rule and the price rule,
allowing those be a correspondence. A reference for anomalies in models with taxes and externalities is Kehoe
et al. (1992).
6Definition 3. An allocation rule x¼ = x(¼) is a sequence of functions that map policies
¼ 2 ¦ into allocations x: A price rule r¼ = r(¼); w¼ = w(¼); R¼ = R(¼) is a sequence of
functions that map policies ¼ 2 ¦ into prices r¼; w¼; R¼:
If we do not introduce any restriction on the optimal policies, the government has
incentives to tax heavily the initial stock of capital. To avoid these problems we assume that




The government is benevolent and values the utility of all households in the economy
from period 0 onwards. Its objective function will be the weighted sum of all generations.
Therefore the government assigns a non negative weight to all generations. The in…nite
sequence is assumed to be bounded above by a positive constant ¡ < 1. Formally !t is the






















!t · ¡ (9)
A particular case of this objective function that will be used latter on to derive some
important results, imposes an exponential decreasing sequence of weight to all agents. This
is important to characterize the optimal …scal policy in steady state. Given the objective
function we can proceed to describe the government problem.
Definition 4. Given an exogenous sequence of public expenditure fGtg1
t=0; a Ramsey equi-
librium is a policy b ¼; an allocation rule xb ¼ and a price rule rb ¼; wb ¼; Rb ¼ that satis…es:




























µi;tki;t(¼)+Bt+1(¼) = Gt+Rt(¼)Bt(¼); 8t (11)
given allocations x(¼) and prices r(¼); w(¼); R(¼):
(ii) The policy b ¼; the allocation rule x(¼) and the price rule r(¼); w(¼); R(¼) belong
to the subset of policies that constitute a competitive equilibrium, b ¼ 2 ¦:
The concept of Ramsey equilibrium is equivalent to a Nash equilibrium, where the
strategies for the government are the policies b ¼ 2 ¦; and households chose x(b ¼) taking as
given competitive prices and the …scal policy.
4. Primal Approach
We will use the primal approach to solve the government problem. The base line is
to de…ne a problem of choosing e¢cient allocations subject to some constraints that restrict
the allocations to be supported as a competitive equilibrium with distortionary taxes. These
constraints are given by feasibility and the implementability constraint. The implementabil-
ity constraint takes into account that changes in the policy will a¤ect agents’ decisions, and
is constructed by substituting the …rst-order conditions of the households and …rms’ prob-
lem in consumers budget constraints. Therefore all constraints depend on allocations. The
following two propositions show equivalence between this problem and the standard Ramsey
equilibrium problem.






t=0 in a competitive equilibrium
satisfy the resource constraint, and an implementability for each generation. The imple-














= 0; t ¸ 0 (12)
and for the initial old generations s ´ [2;I] (the s term will denote the initial generations)
at t = 0 the implementability constraint has a shorter life-span and the initial endowment of


















0; s = 2;:::;I; (13)
Proof. Is straightforward to see that any competitive equilibrium by de…nition satis…es
the resource constraint. To derive the implementability constraint we …nd households …rst-
order conditions with respect to ci
t; `i
t; ai
t+1. Assuming an interior solution and being ®t the
Lagrange multiplier of the intertemporal budget constraint we have:
¯
iUci
t = ®t(1 + ¿ci;t); 8t;i (14)
¯
iU`i
t = ¡®t(1 ¡ ¿`i;t)wt; 8t;i (15)
and with respect to ai+1;t+1 :
®t = ®t+1(1 + rt+1(1 ¡ µi+1;t+1)); 8t;i (16)
to derive the implementability constraint we have to multiply (14);(15) with its respective
control variable and then add them up, we substitute households budget constraint and using
(16) we can eliminate the asset holdings. The resulting expression is the implementability
constraint for the new born. The initial old at t = 0 will have a wealth endowment, that
appears on the right hand side of the implementability constraint.
9In the standard representative agent economies the government only faces one imple-
mentability constraint, due to the fact that there is only one agent in the economy that lives
in…nite periods. In this case, there are in…nite agents that live a …nite number of periods,
this implies that all agents have their implementability constraint that re‡ects that changes
in the policy will a¤ect their optimal decisions.
Proposition 2. Given the initial allocations and the initial policies, if there is a sequence
of allocations that satis…es feasibility and the implementability constraint of all agents we can
construct a sequence of policies and prices, that together with the allocations and the price
system constitute a competitive equilibrium with distortionary taxes.
Proof. The supporting prices are determine by the …rms …rst-order conditions:
rt = FKt ¡ ±; 8t; (17)
wt = FLt; 8t; (18)
The optimal speci…c taxes from t ¸ 0 can be recovered by using the …rst-order condi-
















(1 + rt+1(1 ¡ µi+1;t+1)); 8t;i (20)
substituting the equilibrium prices frt;wt;fRi;tgI
i=1g1
t=0 and the optimal allocations x con-
stitute a system of equations from were we can obtain the optimal policy. Notice that if
feasibility and the implementability constraint (households’ …rst-order conditions and budget
10constraint) are satis…ed, then by Walras law the government budget constraint is also satis-
…ed. From the consumer budget constraint we obtain the asset holding consistent with prices
and taxes. The di¤erence between the aggregate level of assets and the capital stock gives
the aggregate level of debt.
The optimal policy associated with the Ramsey allocations is not unique, the decen-
tralization of the Ramsey allocation problem is conditioned by set of instruments that are
available for the government.
Corollary 1. Given an exogenous sequence of public expenditure fgtg1
t=0; the initial distri-
bution of wealth ai;0; if ¼ = ff¿ci;t;¿`i;t;µi;tgI
i=1g1
t=0 is the optimal policy associated to an e¢-













that support the same allocation.
In this case we have redundancy of instruments, because the number of equations at
each period is 3 ¤ I and the number of instruments is 4 ¤ I: The redundancy of instruments
depends on the number of equations that need to satisfy the equilibrium conditions and the
number of …scal instruments. The primal approach implies implement the wedges between the
marginal rates of substitution and marginal rates of transformation, but it does not prescribe
any particular type of instruments. This implies that the optimal policy can be supported
as a competitive equilibrium under a variety of tax schemes. The unique requirement to
decentralize the economy is have a complete set of instruments, that means that there are
enough instruments to equate all wedges. We will see later on the implications of relaxing
this assumption. For simplicity, the analysis will be restricted to optimal policies where only
11taxes on production factors ¼ = ff¿`i;t;µi;tgI
i=1g1
t=0 and debt Bt+1 are available.3
Proposition 3. The allocation on the Ramsey equilibrium (RE) solves the Ramsey alloca-
























































0; s = 2;:::;I; (24)
where the initial distribution of wealth as;0 for s 2 (2;I) is given.
The main di¤erence between those two problems is that the RAP does not depend on
taxesand prices. Theexistence of asolution dependson the propertiesof the implementability
constraint. Except for the implementability constraint, this problem is equivalent to a growth
model with a …nite number of goods. To …nd a solution, is useful to rede…ne the objective
function by introducing the implementability constraint on it, and its associated Lagrange
multiplier as co-state variable. Let ´t be the Lagrange multiplier of the implementability
















3The case where budget balanced is imposed at each period will not be studied in this paper. In this case
will be necessary to use consumption taxes, otherwise the set of instruments will be incomplete, see Chari
and Kehoe (1998) for a detail explanation.
4See Marcet and Marimon (1998) to see under what conditions we can expand the state space to include
the Lagrange multiplier as a co-state variable.























subject to resource constraint. The …rst-order conditions of an interior solution for this









t+1(1 ¡ ± + FKt+1); 8i;t (28)
Vci




t ; 8i;t (29)
Equation (27)is the intratemporal condition between consumption and labor, note
that the V (¢) are di¤erent objects than the utility function. Equation (28)is the intertem-
poral condition that says how much capital is going to be invested next period according
the government subjective valuation of future generations and the marginal productivity of
capital. Equation (29) implies that the planner will assign resources according within two
di¤erent generation depending on the ratio of relative weight of each generation.
For the s initial generations at t = 0; the …rst-order conditions are slightly di¤erent















0 ((1 + ro(1 ¡µs0)as
0)
= ¡FL0 ¢ ²
s; (30)




















We also have a transversality condition, but in this case it will not add su¢ciency
because the …rst-order conditions are only necessary to characterize the optimal solution.
lim
t!1¹t ¢ Kt+1 = 0 (31)
135. Particular Functional Forms
This section characterizesthe optimal …scal policy forsome particularfunctional forms.
Under the assumption of a complete set of …scal instruments, certain types of utility function
satisfy Chamley (1986) result.
Proposition 4. If the utility function is of this type u(c;`) = c1¡¾
1¡¾ + h(`); it can be shown
that is no optimal tax capital accumulation decisions from period 2 onwards.5
Proof. In order to proof this result I proceed in two steps. First show that age speci…c capital
taxes for the newborns are zero from period 1 onwards, and then that capital taxes for the




t+1(1 ¡± + FKt+1); t ¸ 0 (32)
the competitive equilibrium …rst-order conditions for the newborns are given by:
Uci
t = ¯Uci+1
t+1(1 + rt+1(1 ¡ µi;t+1)); 8t (33)


































therefore the optimal policy implies set µi;t+1 = 0: So is optimal not distort capital accumula-
tion for the newborn generations. Second, I need to show that the s old generation only will
have positive taxes on capital on the …rst period. At t = 0; the Ramsey allocation …rst-order
conditions for the initial generations:
e Vcs
0 = ¯Vcs+1

















1 (1 + r1(1 ¡ µs;1)); s 2 (2;I ¡ 1) (36)
Notice that there are s initial old, but only I ¡ 2 have saving decisions. This type of utility










; s 2 (2;I ¡1) (37)




2 (1 ¡± + FK2); s 2 (2;I ¡2) (38)
Hence µs;2 = 0: From this point onwards age speci…c capital taxes are zero for all agents.
This implies that from period t ¸ 2; capital taxes will be zero for all agents, and
di¤erent from zero in period 1: The initial capital taxes at period 0 are given. This result
relies on the separability between consumption and leisure, homotheticity, and the ability of
the government to tax di¤erently all generations.
156. Steady State Analysis
The purpose of this section is analyze if there are other type of utility functions that
might deliver the zero capital result as an asymptotic property but not along the transition
path. In order to study the optimal …scal policy in the steady state is necessary to have addi-
tional assumptions in the government objective function. Let’s assume that the government
assigns the same weight discounted by time to each generation utility function, formally °t




where ° parameter indicates how much weight the government values future versus current
generations, and ¡ is a positive constant. Using this objective functions, the …rst-order
conditions for steady state are,
1
°
= 1 ¡ ± + FK (39)
V`i
Vci






A feature of this model, is that if the economy converges to the steady state, this
is independent of the initial conditions and the transition path, see Escolano (1992). The
government discount factor determines the interest rate in steady state. For the general
type of utility functions that are additively separable capital taxes are zero in steady state,
because the new type of constraint optima allocations is a subset of the general welfare
function. With non-separable utility functions Chamley (1986) result can be proved under
16additional assumptions on the government discount factor and the endowment of e¢ciency
units.





and ¯ = °, and ²1 = ::: = ²I; then capital taxes will be zero in steady state
Proof. The basic underling in this proof is that under this assumptions, from the planner
point of view, this economy is equivalent to an in…nite lived agents economy. If the planner
and households discount factors are the same, then the redistributive condition implies that
all agents will have the same marginal rates of substitution. That, does not mean that all
agents will achieve the same allocation in terms of consumption and leisure because agents are
endowed with di¤erent e¢ciency units of labor. The additional assumption of equal e¢ciency
units across generations ensures that all households will achieve the same allocation in terms
of consumption and leisure at each period. Hence this condition will imply that marginal rates
of substitution between consumption and leisure will be equal across generations. Therefore
this model perfectly behaves as a representative consumer economy, and reproduces Chamley
(1986) result.
Formally this is straightforward by comparing the …rst-order conditions of the com-
petitive equilibrium in steady state,
1 = ¯(1 + r(1 ¡ µi)) (43)
with the Ramsey e¢cient allocation (under this assumptions Uci = Uci+1) :
1 = ¯(1 ¡ ± + Fk)
17then it must be the case that µi = 0; for all i:
7. Incomplete Set of Instruments
An important assumption in the previous section is that the government can perfectly
discriminate taxes among di¤erent generations. Suppose the tax system does not allow tax
rates in capital returns or labor income di¤er across consumers. Escolano (1992) analyses a
similar model imposing this additional assumption, but uses the dual approach of optimal
…scal policy. Adding this assumption imposes additional restriction on the Ramsey problem
because restricts the set of instruments that the government can use to implement the e¢cient
allocation. Let’s consider …rst the restriction that taxes in capital returns must be equal
across households, that is µi = µ for all i. The additional restrictions that must be added






= ¯(1 + rt+1(1 ¡ µt+1)); 8t;i (44)











; 8t; i = 1;:::;I (45)
As in the previous case, this additional restrictions can be added in the government
objective function, introducing the associate Lagrange multiplier as a co-state variable. Let
Ài
t be the Lagrange multiplier of this additional sequence of I ¡1 constraints for each period.
Now let’s assume that taxes on labor income must be equal across consumers, ¿`i;t = ¿










The main conclusions is that with this additional assumption capital taxes are not generally
zero in steady state, only for some speci…c government discount factor he obtains the standard
result.
8. Conclusions
This paper introduces the theory of optimal taxation in economies were agents have
a …nite lifetime. This approach departs from the pioneer works of Auerbach and Kotliko¤
(1987) and introduces the government in the economy as an active agent that chooses the
optimal …scal policy. The theory of optimal taxation is applied to answer how to determine
the optimal …scal policy in the transition path converging to the steady state. It can be shown
that if the government has a complete set of taxes (age speci…c taxes) and the utility function
is addtively separable, then capital taxes are zero in the transition path after the second
period. More over, with additional assumptions on the discount factor and the endowment
of e¢ciency units, it can be proved that with non-separable utility functions is not optimal
tax capital in steady state.
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